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FOR THE PETITIONER 
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, 
with Kathryn Grill Graeff, Assistant Attorney General 
Do police officers have the authority, during a 
traffic stop, to order the passengers to exit the 
vehicle? This question implicates the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and it involves the weighing 
of the liberty and privacy interests of persons 
traveling on the public roadways against the safety 
of police officers who conduct thousands of traffic 
stops every day. Courts throughout the nation were 
divided on the answer to this question. On 
February 19, 1997, the Supreme Court resolved the 
controversy; it held that a police officer making a 
traffic stop may, as a matter of course, order the 
passengers to get out of the car pending completion 
of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 
886 (1997). 
The case started on June 8, 1994, when a 
Maryland State Trooper observed a car speeding 
on Interstate 95 in Baltimore County, with what 
appeared to be suspicious license plate tags. The 
officer activated his cruiser's lights and siren, but 
the driver continued driving for approximately one 
and one-half miles before finally stopping. During 
the pursuit, the officer observed that the two 
passengers in the car turned and looked at the 
officer several times, repeatedly ducking below the 
seat level and then reappearing. 
Once the car stopped, the officer continued to 
see a lot of movement in the car, which made him 
hesitant to approach it. The officer, who was alone 
in his cruiser, got out and saw that the driver of the 
vehicle had already exited the car. The officer 
directed the driver to step back toward him, and the 
officer met the driver between their vehicles. The 
driver, who was unusually nervous, produced a 
valid Connecticut driver's license and stated that 
the rental papers were in the car. 
The officer told the driver to retrieve the rental 
papers, and the driver went back to the car. The 
officer observed that the front seat passenger, Jerry 
Lee Wilson, was sweating and extremely nervous. 
Because the officer was concerned for his safety, 
he asked Wilson to get out of the car and step 
toward him. After initially refusing to comply with 
this request, Wilson opened the door and took one 
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step out, whereupon crack cocaine dropped to the 
ground. Wilson was indicted on charges of 
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, 
as well as related offenses. Prior to trial in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Wilson moved to 
suppress the cocaine, arguing that the officer had 
violated Wilson's Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable seizures by ordering him to step 
out of the car. The circuit court agreed, ruling that 
an officer could not order a passenger out of a car 
without reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
passenger was involved in criminal activity, and that 
there was no such suspicion in this case. 
Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that the exit 
order was an unlawful seizure and the evidence of 
cocaine should be suppressed. 
The State of Maryland appealed the trial 
court's suppression order to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. The State argued that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the seizure in this case was 
not unreasonable. Initially, the State argued that it 
was reasonable for an officer making a traffic stop 
to order a passenger out of the vehicle without any 
suspicion that the . passenger was involved in 
criminal activity. The ultimate test of whether the 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures has been violated is 
reasonableness, and reasonableness "is judged by 
balancing [the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
The State noted that, twenty years ago, in 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the 
Supreme Court had applied this balancing test to 
hold that an officer conducting a traffic stop could 
order the driver to exit the vehicle without any 
particularized suspicion that the driver had 
committed any wrongdoing independent of the 
traffic stop. The Supreme Court balanced the 
driver's privacy and liberty interests against the 
State's interest in protecting its police officers 
during potentially dangerous traffic stops. Id. at 
110-11. The Court concluded that the State's 
interest in the safety of its officers far outweighed 
the driver's interest in not routinely being made to 
step out of the car after it had been stopped for a 
traffic violation. Id. at 111. The Court stated that 
"[w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience cannot 
prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns 
for the officer's safety." Id. 
The State argued that the Mimms analysis 
applied to any occupant of a vehicle stopped for a 
traffic violation. A passenger presents as significant 
a danger to the safety of the police officer as the 
driver and, indeed, the potential danger to an officer 
increases with the number of occupants in a car. 
Accordingly, the State argued, it was reasonable for 
an officer to automatically order the passenger to 
exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. 
The State made the alternate argument that, 
even if suspicion of criminal, activity was necessary 
to authorize a police officer to order a passenger 
out of a car, the officer had the requisite suspicion 
here. We argued that the extreme nervousness of 
Wilson and the driver, along with the furtive 
movements of the passengers and that the vehicle 
did not pull over for one and one-half miles after 
being pursued with flashing lights and sirens, gave 
the officer reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
occupants of the vehicle were, or had been, 
involved in a crime. Accordingly, we asked the 
court of special appeals to reverse the circuit court's 
suppression order. 
The court of special appeals rejected the 
State's argument that the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the passenger was 
involved in criminal activity. Maryland v. Wilson, 
106 Md. App. 24, 28-31 (1995). With respect to the 
argument that a police officer has the automatic 
right to order a passenger to exit the vehicle, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recognized 
that some states had adopted this position. Id. at 
46-47. It believed, however, that the result of the 
balancing process was different for a passenger 
than it was for a driver, suggesting that the "cost" of 
the exit order was higher for the passenger 
because the passenger had not committed the 
traffic violation that resulted in the vehicle's stop. 
Id. at 42-43. Accordingly, the Court of Special 
Appeals affirmed the lower court's suppression 
order, holding that it was reasonable for a police 
officer to order a passenger out of the vehicle only 
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when the officer had some suspicion of danger. Id. 
at 48. 
The State then filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, asking the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
to hear the case. On November 22, 1995, the 
Court of Appeals denied the State's petition. 
The State then had to decide whether to take 
the issue to the United States Supreme Court. 
Over 6,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari are filed,' 
in the United States Supreme Court ,every year, 
and, in recent terms, the Supreme Court has 
granted review in fewer than 100 cases., 66 
U.S.L.W. 3136 (August 12, 1997). Thus, it takes 
more than an interesting issue to prompt the 
Supreme Court to decide to hear a case, and the 
State wanted to do everything possible to increase 
the odds that the Supreme Court would grant our 
petition in this case. Knowing that one factor that 
weighs heavily in the Supreme Court's decision to 
hear a case is whether there is a split of authority in 
the United States, we researched the law in all the 
states and federal districts. There was a definite 
split of authority on the issue of whether a police 
officer could automatically order a passenger to exit 
a vehicle during a traffic stop. Twenty states,l and 
five federal courts,2 were of the view that an officer 
, State v. Webster, 824 P.2d 768. 770 (Ariz. 1991); People v. Melgosa, 
753 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo. 1988); State v. Dukes, 547 A,2d 10, 22 
(Conn. 1988); Thomas v. United States, 553 A,2d 1206, 1207 n.7 (D.C. 
1989); Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 596 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1992); People v. 
Salvator, 602 N.E.2d 953, 963 (III. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 610 
N.E,2d 1273 (III. 1993); WarT v. State, 580 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1991); State v. Landry, 588 So, 2d 345, 347 (La. 1991); 
Commonwealth v. Pappalardo, 10 Mass. App. 409 N.E.2d 815, 816 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Martinez, 466 N.w.2d 380, 384 n.5 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 483 N.W.2d 868 
(Mich. 1992); State v. Ferrise, 269 N.w.2d 888, 890-91 (Minn. 1978); 
State v. Reynolds, 753 S.w.2d 1, 2 (Mo. App. 1988); People v. 
Robinson, 543 N,E.2d 733,733-34 (N,Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S, 
966 (1989); State v. Collins, 248 S.E.2d 405, 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); 
State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W,2d 93,96 (N,D, 1993); State v. Williams, 
641 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), dismissed, 639 N.E.2d 114 
(Ohio 1994); Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A,2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 664 A,2d 972 (Pa. 1995); State v. 
Soares, 648 A.2d 804, 806 (R.1. 1994); Graham v. State, 893 S.W.2d 
4,7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Bethea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 419 
S.E.2d 249, 250-52 (Va. App. 1992) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 
429 S.E.2d 211 (Va, 1993); State v. Richardson, 456 N.W.2d 830, 836 
(Wis. 1990). 
2 Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1841 (1996); United States v. Hill, 60 
F.3d 672, 682 (10th Cir 1995.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 432 (1995); 
United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991); United States V. Sanders, 631 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 13 
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did have this automatic authority, whereas five 
states3 took the position that an officer must have 
some level of suspicion to issue an exit order. 
Once we found this split of authority, there 
were tactical decisions to make. For example, we 
had to decide whether to raise the issue of 
reasonable suspicion to order the passenger to exit 
the vehicle. Although we believed that the 
nervousness, the furtive movements, and the initial 
failure to stop gave the officer reasonable suspicion 
to believe the occupants of the vehicle were 
involved in criminal activity, we decided not to 
include this issue in our petition for a writ of 
certiorari. The issue of whether the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to justify a Fourth Amendment 
seizure involved a routine application of the facts to 
a well-established principle of law and was unlikely 
to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Including 
this issue might detract from the other issue, not yet 
decided by the Supreme Court, whether the police 
had the automatic right to order passengers to exit 
the vehicle. Accordingly, we decided to confine our 
petition to this one novel issue. 
The State also sought amicus support for its 
argument. That other states or organizations are 
willing to take the time to write an amicus brief 
signals to the Court the importance of the issue 
involved. Indeed, statistics compiled indicate that 
of the state petitions for a writ of certiorari filed in 
the United States Supreme Court that are filed with 
amicus support, fifty percent are granted. Supreme 
Court Report (National Association of Attorneys 
General, Washington, D.C.), October 10, 1997, at 
2. Thus, having amicus support may increase the 
chances that a petition will be granted. 
The National Association for Attorneys 
General sent notice to the Office of the Attorney 
General in every state, setting forth the issue to be 
presented to the Supreme Court and asking if any 
state was interested in providing amicus support. 
The Ohio Attorney General's Office ultimately 
F.2d 1309, 1312 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 
(1981); United States v. McCoy, 824 F. Supp. 467, 474 (D. Del. 1993). 
3 People v. Maxwell, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 1008-09, 254 Cal. Rptr. 
124, 126-27 (1988); State v. Becker, 458 NW.2d 604, 607 (Iowa 
1990); State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 12 (Md. App. 1995), cert. denied, 
667 A.2d 342 (Md. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997); State v. Smith, 
637 A.2d 158, 166 (N.J. 1994); Johnson v. State, 601 SW.2d 326, 
328-29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). 
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agreed to write an amicus curiae ("friend of the 
court") brief in support of Maryland's petition, and 
twenty-five states and the Virgin Islands joined 
Ohio's amicus brief. 
After we filed our petition for a writ of certiorari, 
we became aware that this same issue was 
pending before the Supreme Court in another case. 
In Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323 
(9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit, in a civil rights 
case, had taken a different position from the one 
taken by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
and held that a police officer could order a 
passenger out of the vehicle without any 
reasonable suspicion. That case was scheduled to 
be conferenced by the Supreme Court shortly 
before Maryland's petition was set to be 
conferenced. When the Supreme Court denied the 
petition for writ of certiorari in Ruvalcaba, it was 
unclear what import that decision had on 
Maryland's case. We had the answer several 
weeks later. On June 17, 1996, however, the 
Supreme Court granted Maryland's petition for a 
writ of certiorari. We had forty five days to write our 
brief, file an appendix with pertinent lower court 
proceedings, and coordinate amicus briefs. 
The team of lawyers that had been involved in 
the petition for a writ of certiorari began work on the 
brief. This team consisted of the authors of this 
article: Gary Bair, Chief of the Criminal Appeals 
Division, and Mary Ellen Barbera, Deputy Chief of 
the Criminal Appeals Division. 
We poured through Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, including all decisions dealing with 
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and the applicable balancing 
analysis. The first component was the 
gove"rnmental interest to be served by allowing 
officers to automatically order passengers from the 
vehicle during a traffic stop. We culled through the 
decisions holding that officer safety is a compelling 
governmental interest, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 
U.S. 325, 333-34 (1990); New York v. Class, 475 
U.S. 106, 116 (1986); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U. S. at 110-11, and recognizing that traffic stops 
are particularly dangerous to police officers, see 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); New 
York v. Class, 475 U.S. at 116-17; Foley v. 
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978). We noted that 
the danger inherent in roadside encounters only 
increases when passengers are present. 
Passengers, like drivers, are likely to have access 
to weapons that may be inside the passenger area 
of a car. Moreover, the passenger could act with 
the driver or other passengers to attack the officer, 
or ambush the officer while he or she is dealing with 
the driver. 
We compiled statistics from the Department of 
Justice showing that over five thousand police 
officers are assaulted each year during the course 
of traffic stops. We also visited the scene of the 
crime to get a better idea of what an officer faces. 
The traffic stop in this case occurred on a busy 
highway, Interstate 95, in Baltimore County. As we 
sat on the shoulder of the highway, with the cars 
speeding by, it became much more apparent how 
necessary it was for an officer to be able take 
control of the traffic stop. 
We then looked at the other side of the 
balancing equation - the intrusion on the passenger. 
We compiled Supreme Court cases detailing that 
there was a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle due to the public nature of automobile travel 
and the pervasive governmental regulations on 
automobile travel. See New York v. Class, 475 
U.S. at 113; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364, 368 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 
433, 441 (1973). Because people who travel on the 
public roadways are subject to being stopped by a 
governmental agent at sobriety checkpoints, toll 
booths, or for traffic violations, passengers, like 
drivers, enjoy only minimal privacy and liberty 
interests. 
In addition to the decreased expectation of 
privacy in the car, the intrusion at issue here was 
minimal. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Supreme 
Court described the intrusion of asking the driver to 
step out of the vehicle as "de minimis" and "a mere 
inconvenience." 434 U.S. at 111. The order to the 
passenger to step out of the vehicle is similarly an 
inconsequential intrusion. 
We anticipated that Wilson would argue, as 
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals had found, 
that the analysis was different for the passenger 
because the passenger, as opposed to the driver, 
had committed no wrongdoing. We wanted to 
counter that argument by pointing to other 
instances where the police have the authority to 
control the movements of people without any 
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suspicion of wrongdoing. We noted that the police 
interfere with the movement of people when they 
evacuate a building in response to a bomb threat, 
secure a crime scene, or reroute traffic around a 
parade or traffic accident. Thus, the fact that the 
police had no knowledge that the passenger had 
done anything wrong did not make the seizure 
unreasonable. 
In addition to assessing the legal arguments, 
we had to consider the practical effect this case 
would have on police officers. Although the officer 
in this case testified that he ordered the passenger 
out of the vehicle for his safety, we recognized that, 
in some instances, it might be safer for the officer to 
order all the passengers to remain in the car while 
the officer completed the traffic stop. We spoke 
with police officers throughout the State regarding 
how officers are trained to respond to a traffic stop. 
As it turned out, police officers are typically trained 
to order all occupants, drivers and passengers 
alike, to remain seated inside the vehicle while the 
police officer completes the traffic stop. 
We wondered if this general police policy to 
keep passengers in the vehicle would weaken our 
position that it was reasonable automatically to 
order a passenger to exit the vehicle. We were 
told, however, that, although the general policy is to 
keep passengers in the vehicle, the officer 
ultimately is taught to control the risk during a traffic 
stop. The officer attending the traffic stop is the 
only one who can assess, under the circumstances 
of that particular stop, whether it is safer to keep the 
passengers in the car or to order them out of the 
car where the officer can better see if they have any 
weapons. Thus, the State's position was that if an 
officer felt it was safer to ask the passenger to exit 
the vehicle while he or she completed the traffic 
stop, this was reasonable conduct under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Although our case involved only an exit order, 
we decided to propose a rule that would cover both 
an exit order and an order to remain in the vehicle. 
Such a rule would cover this case, as well as the 
typical police practice, and another decision that 
had recently been issued by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, Dennis v. State, 674 A.2d 928 (Md. 
1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 40 (1996). 
In Dennis, a police officer ordered the 
passenger to stay in the vehicle and the passenger 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 15 
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refused. The passenger got out of the car and 
started to walk away. The officer again told the 
passenger to stay with the vehicle, and when the 
passenger refused to comply, the officer forcibly 
stopped the passenger. A struggle ensued, and the 
passenger was ultimately charged with disorderly 
conduct and battery. Id. at 199. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland reversed the convictions, 
holding that the officer did not have the legal right to 
order the passenger to remain in the vehicle and 
Dennis, therefore, had the right to resist the 
ensuing unlawful arrest. Id. at 211-12. 
Maryland was filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the Dennis case as well,4 and we 
decided to propose a rule in this case that would 
allow both types of orders, an order to the 
passenger to exit the vehicle or an order to stay in 
the vehicle, whichever the police officer thought 
was the best way to safely complete the traffic stop. 
Accordingly, the State proposed a rule that would 
allow the police to take limited steps to control the 
movements of the passengers during the brief time 
it took to complete the traffic stop. 
Argument was set for December 11, 1996. 
Each side would get thirty minutes to argue its 
position. For Petitioner, the State of Maryland 
would have twenty minutes and the United States, 
as amicus, would get ten minutes. J. Joseph 
Curran, Jr., Maryland's Attorney General, would be 
arguing for the State of Maryland, his second 
argument before the United States Supreme Court. 
Janet Reno, the United States Attorney General, 
would be arguing for the United States, her first 
argument before the Court. 
Although the brief had already been written, 
there was much to be done. Cases were read and 
reread. Numerous hypotheticals were devised. 
Although our rule seemed simple, the police could 
take limited steps to control the movements of all 
4 The Supreme Court subsequently granted Maryland's petition and 
vacated the Court of Appeals' decision in Dennis, remanding for the 
Court of Appeals to reconsider the case in light of another Supreme 
Court case, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). Mary/and 
v. Dennis, 117 S. Ct. 40 (1996). In Whren, the Supreme Court held 
that police conduct is viewed objectively for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, and an officer's subjective intent will not make otherwise 
lawful conduct illegal under the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 1774. On 
remand, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed its initial decision, 
Dennis v. State, 345 Md. 654 (1997), and the Supreme Court denied 
the State's petition for a writ of certiorari, Mary/and v. Dennis, 118 S. 
Ct. 329 (1997). 
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occupants of the vehicle during the time it took to 
complete the traffic stop, the boundaries of these 
limited steps were not so clear. Although our case 
involved nothing more than the exit order, we 
needed to be prepared to explain exactly how f~r 
our proposed rule would go. We ultimately decided 
to ask for a rule that allowed an officer to order a 
passenger to get out of the vehicle, show his hands, 
and remain at the scene until the officer completed 
the traffic stop. Although further actions might be 
reasonable in certain circumstances, even without 
any suspicion of wrongdoing, it was Maryland's 
position that it was always reasonable to order the 
passenger to exit, to show his hands and to remain 
at the scene during the traffic stop. 
We set up a schedule of moot courts, tapping 
lawyers with expertise in the Fourth Amendment 
and experience arguing in the Supreme Court. 
Each moot court presented new "worst case" 
scenarios. Was it reasonable to order a passenger 
to exit the vehicle if the passenger was disabled? 
If the passenger was a young child? If it was 
pouring rain and the passenger was on her way to 
the prom? Our response to each of these 
scenarios was the same: we expect our police 
officers to use their judgment in responding to a 
traffic stop, and a police officer probably would not 
require a passenger to exit in those circumstances. 
If an officer did issue an exit order under those 
circumstances, there might be administrative 
sanctions, but it would not constitute a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
In addition to reviewing the case law, devising 
hypotheticals and engaging in moot courts, we took 
other steps to prepare for the argument. We 
attended a Supreme Court argument in Ohio v. 
Robinette, another traffic stop case. We thought 
the Supreme Court's questioning might give us 
insight on the Justices' thoughts regarding police 
power during traffic stops. We also met with Janet 
Reno and the Solicitor General's office to discuss 
our strategy during the argument. 
The day of argument finally arrived. All of our 
preparations paid off. The questioning was intense, 
but we had answers, to the extent there were 
answers, to all of the Justices' questions. However, 
the court wanted more information in the area of 
statistics. Although we ~ad provided statistics on 
the numbers of officers assaulted and killed during 
traffic stops, the Justices wanted even more 
specific information, i. e., how many of those attacks 
occurred while the person was inside, as opposed 
to outside, the vehicle. This information was not 
readily available. Although the Justice Department 
compiled statistics of the number of officers 
assaulted and killed each year, the specificity of the 
statistics was limited. The circumstances under 
which the assaults and deaths occurred were 
broken down into thirteen different categories, such 
as robberies, domestic disputes, bar fights and 
. traffic stops, but there was no further breakdown of 
the particular' circumstances involved in each 
category.5 There was no question, however, that 
traffic stops present a real danger to police officers. 
The Court seemed to accept our proposition 
that, in other instances, the police are permitted to 
control the movements of innocent persons. The 
Court indicated that a police officer is permitted to 
tell bystanders at a crime or arrest scene to stay 
back, and it suggested that allowing the officer to 
order the passenger to get out of the vehicle would 
not give the officer any greater authority than the 
officer has in the case of a public arrest. 
The area with which the Court showed the 
most concern was our position that the officer had 
the authority, after issuing the exit order, to order 
the passenger to remain at the scene during the 
time it took to complete the traffic stop. Although a 
holding that an officer cbuld detain a passenger 
after an exit order was not necessary to our case, 
since the cocaine fell from Wilson's pants as he 
was exiting the car, such a ruling was, in our view, 
the logical next step. Since the rationale for 
allowing the police to issue an exit order to 
passengers is to protect officers, it would be logical 
to allow the officer to require the passengers to 
remain where the officer can see the passengers, 
rather than allow the passengers to leave the 
scene, hide behind a tree or a bush and then 
ambush the officer as he or she deals with the 
driver. The State's view was that the officer must 
be able to control the movements of the occupants 
to safely effectuate the stop. The officer could not 
automatically arrest or search the passengers, but 
5 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT OF 
JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 1994, at 33 (1996). 
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he or she should have the authority, if desired, to 
take the limited step of asking the passenger to 
remain at the scene during the brief time it takes to 
complete the traffic stop. 
At the end of the argument, it was unclear how 
the Court would rule. On February 19, 1997, the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion. The Court 
agreed with the State's argument that, with respect 
to the government interest involved, the danger 
facing an officer during a traffic stop is likely to be 
greater when there are passengers in addition to 
the driver in the car. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 
at 885. On the other side of the balancing 
equation, the Court held that the intrusion imposed 
on the passenger, who has already been stopped 
as a result of the traffic stop, is minimal. Id. at 886. 
Accordingly, the Court held that a police officer 
conducting a traffic stop may, as a matter of course, 
order passengers to get out of the car pending 
completion of the stop. Id. An important step 
was taken to protect the safety of police officers 
who confront unknown dangers everyday. The 
Court declined, however, to decide issues not 
specifically presented by this case. The Court did 
not decide whether, once the exit order had been 
issued, the officer could order the passenger to 
re~in at the scene until the traffic stop was 
completed. Nor did the Court rule on the issue 
whether police officers could order passengers to 
remain in the vehicle during a traffic stop. Those 
are issues for another day. 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 17 
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